These would repudiate the implication of purposive activity at some stage in the genesis of the organism, the implication of the maker suggested by the machine-analogy ; and would put [f] natural selection * in the place of the purposive maker.

The second great question raised by the more thorough-going statements of organicism is—If the whole governs the parts and regulates their processes in such ways as contribute to the efficiency of the whole, how does it exert that control ?

And the third question is—How is the unity of the whole constituted and maintained in spite of the partial autonomy of the several parts ?

To these two questions the organicists have no answers that are in the least degree satisfactory. Some of them appeal somewhat vaguely to the *Gestalt* principle. Some seem to feel no need for answers to these questions ; to feel that assertion of the unity of the organism suffices. Others seem to feel that wholeness of the organism is sufficiently explained by reference to the fact that the complex multicellular organism derives from a single cell; oblivious of the fact that the single cell presents the same evidences of unity and the same problems as to the control of the parts by the whole and the manner of maintenance of the whole.

It must be admitted the organicists who remain content with this mere assertion of wholeness, do achieve a certain kind of explanation and understanding impossible to the purely additive materialist; but it is that unsatisfying kind of explanation which leaves us still hungering for

the true understanding only to be achieved by dynamic explanation in terms of causal activity, whether mechan-
i stic or teleological What the recognition of the wholeness